Journal Club

Editor's Note: These short, critical reviews of recent papers in tbeurnal, written exclusively by graduate students or postdoctoral fellows, are intended to summarize the important findings of the paper and provide additional insight and commentary. For more information on the format and purpose of the Journal Club, please shetp://www.jneurosci.org/misc/ifa features.shtml

Dissociating Guilt- and Inequity-Aversion in Cooperation and Norm Compliance

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¹Center for Brain and Cognitive Sciences and Department of Psychology, Peking University, Beijing**イlnೞ೫೫೧೬,f6ht෬a**gaitide Science, Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309 Review of Nihonsugi et al.

Social norms provide a set of expecta-with norms to avoid suffering from harm- the likelihood of the trustee reciprocating. tions regarding context-specific appro- ing another as a result of violating the Participants then played the role of the priate behavior that aids in navigating norms (e.g., guilt-aversion). social environments Bicchieri, 2006 even at the cost of their own interesten and Fischbacher, 2004Expectations vary widely across culturesHenrich et al., 2001) and there are likely differing motivations for individuals to comply with of its moral worth (Mill, 1861/1998). to sentimentalism\$mith, 1759/2002empathy with others "constitutes the moral approval. . . for agents and/or their ac-measure Chang et al., 201 Chang and tions" (Slote, 2010 This framework ar-Sanfey, 2013and manipulate Kiang et gues that people are motivated to comply al., 2013 agents' expectations.

trustee with multiple anonymous investors In reality, these two motivations are while undergoing fMRI. For each trial, Classic studies have demonstrated thatikely complementary and each may inde-trustees were given information about the people tend to conform to these norms pendently contribute to social decisions investor's expectation and also the payoffs with their relative weights varying across each player would receive based on their deindividuals and contexts. Unfortunately, cision to cooperate or defect. For example, if the majority of the research that uses so-the trustee chose Cooperate, then the invescial bargaining games to study socialtor might receive ¥780 and the trustee ¥650; decision-making has been unable to effec-if the trustee chose Defect, then the investor these norms. For example, one motiva-tively dissociate these two distinct motiva-could receive ¥220 and the trustee ¥910. tion, consequentialism, emphasizes thetions. This is likely a consequence of aThough the actual investors' expectations outcome of an action as the sole measurepeculiar convention in bargaining experi- and decisions were predetermined by the ments to neither measure nor manipu- experimenters, the trustees were led to be-From this philosophical perspective, one late individuals' expectations. Thus, it lieve that they were playing with real agents may avoid violating social norms simply has been unclear how much participants and were paid proportional to their payoffs because unfair and inequitable outcome are motivated by distributional prefer- in the game at the end of the experiment. are bad for the greater good (e.g., distribu-ences (i.e., inequity-aversion) compared Participants' motivations in the game tional preferences). Alternatively, according with disappointing a relationship partner were inferred based on how much they (i.e., guilt-aversion). Fortunately, there considered their partners' expectations has recently been a growing trend to both (e.g., guilt-aversion) and discrepancies between each player's payoffs (e.g., in-

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were modeled was based on expected util-H.Y, B.S, Y.Y, and P.R.B. are supported by grants av 2005) provided an important theoretical ity theory, which assumes that partici-Xiaolin Zhou from the Natural Science Foundation of മൂർയ്യമായ dissociate the inequity- and pants make decisions that maximize their 91232708, 31170972) and the National Basic Research Paparavérsion motivations in human norm expected payoff. Here, payoffs could be We thank Professor Xiaolin Zhou for his helpful comments on burman.

We thank Professor Xiaolin Zhou for his helpful comments on burman. uscript. We are also very grateful to Mr. Yin Wu and Mr. Stach motivation. The experimenters used athe trustee receives) or psychological without whose support this article would not have been possibilified trust game Charness and Duf- (based on concern for the investor's wel-

equity-aversion) when making their deci-

framework for how these motivations

sion to cooperate or defect. The basic

Correspondence should be addressed to Hongbo Ywellsberton which participants inifare) (Fehr and Camerer, 20)07The auof Psychology, Peking University, Beijing 100871, Chinal Email: Chinal decided as an investor whether or not thors specifically compared psychological

to invest their endowment with an anony- payoffs arising from inequitable distribu-Copyright@2015 the authors 0270-6474/15/358973-03810005/trustee and reported their belief about tional outcomes (i.e., the absolute differ-

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ence between the two players' payoffs) (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999and feelings of guilt, which arose from disappointing a relationship partner by making a decision that resulted in the investor receiving a smaller payoff than he/she expected (i.e., the amount of money that the investor would have received had the trustee chosen to cooperate multiplied by the investor's estimated probability of the trustee's cooperation) Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007). It is important to note that trustees had full information about the investor's expectations and each player's payoffs and thus their motivations can be inferred by how much they considered inequity or disappointing the investor when making their decision. A critical aspect of the experimental design was that the payoff matrix was constructed in such a way that the trustees' payoffs were uncorrelated with the amount of inequity between their partner's payoff, and both were uncorrelated with the investors' expectations about the likelihood the trustee would choose Cooperate. This allowed the experimenters to extend previous work (Chang et al., 2011 and disentangle these two otherwise intertwined motivations underlying human cooperation and norm compliance.

The authors found that the two motivations were associated with different neural circuitry. Controlling for guilt, inequity was positively associated with activation in the ventral striatum and amygdala. While other studies have implicated the ventral striatum in tracking inequity, it appears to go in the opposite direction, such that there is greater ventral striatal and amygdala activation associated with decreasing inequity abibnia et al., 2008Tricomi et al., 2010 There are several possible reasons that can account for these discrepancies. First, these studies differed substantially in their design. In this study, the participants made decisions based on the inequity of the payoffs, while participants in the Tricomi et al. (2010)

consequentialism andsentimentalism considerations independently affect norm compliance and cooperation. Moreover, Fehr E, Schmidt KM (1999) A theory of fairness, these motivations appear to be encoded in separate brain circuits. We believe that combining formal mathematical model- Henrich J, Boyd R, Bowles S, Camerer C, Fehr E, ing, neuroscientific techniques, and social psychological theories will continue to further our insight into the material basis of our social nature.

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